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The Case for Agent-Causation
There is a crack, a crack in everything.
That’s how the light gets in.
Leonard Cohen
1 Symbols
event-causation: ø (understood as sucient or almost sucient event-causation,
that is: causation that consists in the fact that event X is ne-cessarily, or almost
necessarily, followed by another event Y).
narrow agent-causation: ⇓ (causation that consists in the fact that agent X makes
an event Y actual, without there being an event that causes Y).¹
(actual) physical event: W
(actual) agent: n
X has experience Y: X → Y, or: Y ← X, or: X →→ Y, or: Y ←← X (X, in contrast to Y,
is not temporally located; X has Y at the time represented by the tip of the arrow
– or by the time that is represented by tip of the second arrow)
2 Conventions
If the symbol of an event is further to the left on the page than the symbol of an-
other event, then this is taken to signify that the rst event occurs earlier than the
second.
“X causes Y” is taken to be a synonym of “X is a sucient or almost sucient
cause of Y”.
1 Concerning the phrase “X causes Y”, see the second convention in Sect. 2 below.
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The complete lack of ø-arrows (black, horizontal arrows) pointing to an item sig-
nies lack of being ø-caused (event-causally caused); but the complete lack of
ø-arrows pointing from an item does not necessarily signify lack of ø-causing
(event-causal causing).
The complete lack of⇓-arrows (white, vertical arrows) pointing to an item signies
lack of being ⇓-caused (agent-causally caused); but the complete lack of ⇓-arrows
pointing from an item does not necessarily signify lack of ⇓-causing (agent-causal
causing).
3 A picture of the causation of physical events as





4 Three alternative pictures of the causation of






























5 Central agent-causal concepts




Note that narrow agent-causation excludes the “simultaneous” event-causation
of the agent-caused event (as is suggested by the picture).
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Agent-causation (simpliciter) is here identied with broad agent-causation; it can
be dened on the basis of narrow agent-causation and event-causation:
X (simpliciter) agent-causes Y df= X narrowly agent-causes Y, or X narrowly agent-
causes some event Z and a chain of event-causation runs from Z to Y.
If an event Y is agent-caused (as dened) and event-causally traceable to, or iden-
tical to, exactly one event Z that is narrowly agent-caused, then the time of the
agent-causation of Y is the time of (the occurrence of) Z.
It is assumed that each agent-caused event is event-causally traceable to, or iden-
tical to, exactly one narrowly agent-caused event. This is a plausible, yet a contin-
gent assumption: there are unusual possible worlds in which that assumption is
not true. But, plausibly, the actual world is not among those possible worlds.
An event that is agent-caused by X is an action of X.
An event that is narrowly agent-caused by X is a direct action of X.
An event that is agent-caused by X, but not narrowly agent-caused, is an indirect
action of X.
An event that is agent-caused by X and that after its time of agent-causation is not
experienced by X as being willed by X is an implicit action of X.
An event that is agent-caused by X and that after its time of agent-causation is
experienced by X as being willed² by X is an explicit action of X.
Comment: It is obvious that the above-dened concept of action (see, above, the
rst denition) is a very wide, a very inclusive concept of action. For example, it
allows events to be actions of X that are far removed, temporally and spatially,
from X, or rather, from the relevant direct action (of X): the event which is the
2 The willing that is experienced with respect to an explicit action has the phenomenology of
“imperativeness”; it also has the phenomenology of personal eectiveness. It is utterly dierent
from wishing.
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“original action” that starts an event-causal chain.³ It does seem natural to add
further necessary conditions for being an action (for example, the condition that
only macroscopic bodily movements – behaviours – of X are actions of X).⁴ I have
nothing in principle against replacing the concept of action I propose by a more
demanding concept. What I insist on, however, is this: being agent-caused is a
necessary condition for being an action. Thus, the above-dened concept of action
is theminimal concept of action.
6 A sucient and agent-causal analysis of an
action – of raising one’s arm
That is: an analysis that provides a truly sucient condition for being an action
(in the particular case considered), and which is agent-causal in nature.
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein (2009), § 621):
Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the problem arises: what
is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?
((Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?))
There is a perfect solution to Wittgenstein’s problem.
But rst a
preliminary remark: Inwhat follows P is the subject of consciousness and agency of
a (let’s assume: female) human being. Phenomenologically speaking, every one
of us is the subject of consciousness and agency of a human being – a human
being that encompasses that subject but is not identical to it. One cannot identify
the subject of consciousness and agency of a human being with the human being
in its entirety, since every one of us can truthfully say the following: “My eyes
are much closer to me than my feet”. It is to a large extent unproblematic – and
common linguistic practice – to ascribe parts and properties of the entire human
beinganalogically also to thehumanbeing’s subject of consciousness and agency.
3 What is – relative to a direct action α of an agent – the spatial, temporal, spatiotemporal dis-
tance δ such that any event that is further away than δ from α cannot count as an action of that
agent, although it be connected to α by an event-causal chain? (Cf. the second illustration in Sect.
10, (a).)
4 This may, in fact, be too strict a requirement.
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Now, it is often true that someone’s arm goes up. Consider a particular case: the
arm of P goes up between t1 and t2.
The going-up of the arm of P between t1 and t2 is a physical event, call it “R”. R is
an event that actually happens; it is an actual event (not a merely possible event).
(But actuality is not an intrinsic trait of events.)
P raises her arm between t1 and t2 if, and only if, R is (not merely an actual event
but also) an action of P.
In other words (according to the denition of action):
P raises her arm between t1 and t2 if, and only if, P agent-causes R (which entails
– but is not entailed by – the fact that R is an actual event).
In fact, if P is a normal human subject in a normal situation and raises her arm
between t1 and t2, then R is an explicit indirect action of P, in other words: (1) P
agent-causes, but does not narrowly agent-cause, R, and (2) P experiences R as
being willed by her after the time of the agent-causation of R.
7 Nine insucient analyses of raising one’s arm
It is not (conceptually) sucient for the fact that R is an action of P (i.e., that P
raises her arm between t1 and t2) that R (the going up of P’s arm between t1 and
t2) is an actual event.
It is not sucient for the fact that R is an action of P that R is an actual event
and that P experiences R before it happens as being willed by her (i.e., that P
experiences that she is – imperatively [cf. footnote 2] – willing R to happen).
It is not sucient for the fact that R is an action of P that P experiences R before
it comes about as being willed by her and that this experience event-causes R (via
an event-causal chain).
It is not sucient for the fact that R is an action of P that there is a physical event
in the brain of P that event-causes R (via an event-causal chain).
It is not sucient for the fact that R is an action of P that there is a physically
causeless physical event in the brain of P that event-causes R.
It is not sucient for the fact that R is an action of P that there is a causeless phys-
ical event in the brain of P that event-causes R.
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It is not sucient for the fact that R is an action of P that some event that intrinsi-
cally involves P, or is in any other non-causal way related to P, event-causes R.
It is not sucient for the fact thatR is an action of P that the combined desires and
beliefs of P event-cause R.
It is not sucient for the fact thatR is an action of P thatR is a rational (mediate or
ultimate) goal with respect to the combined desires and beliefs of P and that the
combined desires and beliefs of P event-cause R.
8 Deviant causal chains?
The agent-causal account of action is not subject to the problem of deviant causal
chains, which besets the standard purely event-causal theory of action, forcing
its proponents to accept as actions events that, intuitively, one does not want to
accept as actions:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a
rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of the
weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to loosen his
hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor did he do it
intentionally. (Davidson (1980), 79)
As long as the climber’s loosening his hold is not agent-caused by him, it is not
an action of his (not even if it is caused – in a deviant, non-normal way – by the
climber’s belief and desire). And Davidson’s scenario indicates that it is precisely
the case that the climber does not agent-cause his loosening his hold.
9 Causal responsibility and moral responsibility
Let X be an agent and Y a certain event:
X is causally responsible for Y i Y is an action of X [that is: i Y is agent-caused
by X].
X ismorally responsible for Y i X is causally responsible for Y and ... [here further
conditions need to be added].
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Principle of responsibility
A person is morally responsible only for those events that she is causally respon-
sible for.
Query: But often a person is morally responsible for an event that she is not
causally responsible for. For example, for an event that she could have prevented,
but did not.
Answer: The best reaction to this query is to widen the concept of causal responsi-
bility. Above we have what is in fact only the denition of narrow causal responsi-
bility. A wider concept of causal responsibility – which allows to speak of causal
responsibility also in cases where one cannot speak of it so far – can be dened
in the following way:
X is causally responsible* for Y i either Y is an action of X, or Y is an actual event
without being an action of X, but some event Zwhich is incompatiblewith Ywould
have been an action of X if only X had willed Z.
The deniens of this denition is taken to be entailed by the state of aairs that X
could have prevented Y, but did not.
Replace “causally responsible” in the Principle of responsibility by “causally re-
sponsible*”.
10 Illustrations
Let me illustrate the value of the concept of agent-causation for action analysis a
little bit further:
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11 Seven objections to agent-causation answered
Objection 1: Each instance of agent-causation must be either a causing of a phys-
ical event or of a non-physical event. Since the existence of non-physical events
is rather questionable, agent-causation of non-physical events is rather question-
able, too. Therefore, agent-causation can be a philosophically interesting option
only if at least some physical events are agent-caused. But every physical event
is already caused by a physical event. Hence: if one assumes that some physical
events are agent-caused, one ismaking a superuous assumption. There is, there-
fore, no good reason to assume the existence of agent-causation.
Response to Objection 1: Leaving entirely aside the question of the existence of
non-physical events and their causation, it is still very likely true that some physi-
cal events are not caused (suciently or almost suciently) by anyphysical event.
This much is strongly suggested by modern physics. There is, therefore, room for
agent-causation; for agents may cause (may make actual) some of the physical
events that are not caused by any physical event.
Objection 2: If there are in fact some physical events that are not caused – that
is, not caused suciently or almost suciently – by any physical event, then the
only reasonable conclusion regarding such events is this: that they – all of them
– are not caused by anything at all, in other words: that their coming about is to
a signicant extent mere chance.
Response to Objection 2: Why is this supposed to be the only reasonable conclu-
sion? No sucient reason for this supposition is apparent. In fact, the very rea-
sonable Principle of Sucient Cause requires that all physical events that are not
caused by any physical event still have some sucient cause. And even if we may
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not wish to appeal to the Principle of Sucient Cause, lest we seem dogmatic, it
also seems dogmatic to assert that all physical events that are not caused by any
physical event have no sucient cause. How could one be justied in excluding
that at least some of those events have a sucient cause?
Objection 3: But if some physical event that is not caused by any physical event
had a sucient cause, then this would constitute a violation of the Principle of
Causal Closure of the Physical World, whether one identies that principle with
the proposition that every sucient cause of a physical event is itself a physical
event, or with the logically weaker proposition that every physical event that has a
sucient cause also has aphysical event as sucient cause. ThePrinciple of Causal
Closure of the Physical World, especially its logically weaker version, just cannot
be violated.
Response to Objection 3: Wouldn’t you agree, on reection, that this, your last as-
sertion, is a piece of sheer metaphysical dogmatism?
Objection 4: Well, not just metaphysics, also physics itself speaks against su-
cient causes of physical events that are not caused by any physical event. For
if some physical event that is not caused by any physical event had a sucient
cause, then the conservation principles of physics would be violated, because
causation must manifest itself in the physical world by a change of energy and
momentum.
Response to Objection 4: It is true that causation must manifest itself in the phys-
ical world by a change of energy and momentum. But if every such change vio-
lated the conservation laws, then these laws would be violated all the time, since
changes of energy and momentum occur all the time. What is true is this: presup-
posing that the physical world is a physically closed system – that is, a system ex-
changing no energy ormomentumwith an outside –, the conservation laws forbid
changes of energy andmomentumwhich are such that they involve an increase or
decrease in the sum total of energy, respectively, momentum; the principle of the
conservation of momentum also forbids changes of momentum which are such
that they involve a modication in the total direction of momentum. But it cannot
be established – at least not given today’s physics – that causing a physical event
that is not caused by any physical event must involve a modication in the sum
total of energy, or ofmomentum, or amodication in the total direction ofmomen-
tum. One need not invoke here a physics-compatible causation of physical events
by non-physical events; one can do better than this. Causing an event that is not
caused by any physical event is best regarded as consisting in the active resolution
of a situation of physical indetermination, that is, in choosing and actualizing one
of several possible but, on the basis of the laws of physics, incompatible physical
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events, each of which is compatible, on the basis of the laws of physics, with the
given physical past. That situations of physical indetermination occur is allowed
by present-day physics. And the combination of choosing and actualizing which
resolves such a situation of physical indetermination must be regarded as the ac-
tive work of an agent. This causal work does certainly not hurt the conservation
laws, as little as the resolution of a situation of physical indetermination by sheer
chance hurts those laws (as is admitted on all sides).
Objection 5: If this is what agent-causation consists in – narrow agent-causation,
I suppose, according to your conceptual scheme –, then agent-causation does not
seem to dier from xed predetermination or, alternatively, from the workings of
chance. Let me explain, along the lines of a thought-experiment which is due to
Peter van Inwagen.⁵ Let the situation of physical indetermination recur in exactly
the same way an indenite number of times. If the agent always does the same
thing (chooses and actualizes the same physical event), then the agent appears to
be predetermined. If, however, the agent does not always do the same thing, then
the agent appears to be subject to chance, and subject to chance in the highest
degree if the agent actualizes each possibility that is open to her in the (recurring,
and recurring) situationof indeterminationwith the same frequency.Howcanyou
assure, as you surely wish to, that the agent is neither subject to predetermination
nor to chance?
Response to Objection 5: If it is always the same event which is chosen and ac-
tualized in each recurrence of the same situation of physical indetermination,
then this does not necessarily mean that the agent is somehow predetermined
to choose and actualize that event. It may simply mean that rationality always
tells the agent that she ought to actualize that particular event, and that the agent
always decides to follow this constant advice of rationality. If it is not always the
same event which is chosen and actualized in each recurrence of the same situ-
ation of physical indetermination, then this does not necessarily mean that the
agent is subject to chance. It may simply mean that the agent in one recurrence
of the situation decides to follow the constant advice of rationality to actualize a
certain event, but in another recurrence decides to be irrational and to choose and
actualize quite another event. I concede that, in an analysis of action that is based
on agent-causation, there is in the causal explanation of action no going beyond
the decision of the agent, that is: no going beyond the agent’s initiating step of
causation. In an analysis of action that is based on agent-causation, the causal
explanation of action must stop with the agent’s initiating step of causation. But
5 Van Inwagen (2002), 175–177.
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this, in itself, does certainly notmake the agent subject to chance. The agent is not
subject to chance in her decision if, in her decision, instead of throwing dice she
is following the advice of rationality (which, properly speaking, is her own advice:
the advice that she is giving herself from the rational point of view). In turn, the
agent’s following the advice of rationality is, in itself, certainly not an instance of
predetermination: rationality – since it is essentially normative, yielding, at best,
only ought to and ought not to (relative to the agent’s beliefs and desires) – is not
a sort of prolongation of event-causal determination.
Objection 6: In order to be relevant for the physical world, agent-causation re-
quires situations of physical indetermination. But while such situations may per-
haps occur in the physical micro-world, they certainly do not occur in the human
sphere. Agent-causation, therefore, is irrelevant for the analysis of physical hu-
man action.
Response to Objection 6: Suppose you were right and situations of physical inde-
termination did not occur in the human sphere. Then, indeed, agent-causation
would be irrelevant for the analysis of physical human action – for the simple
reason that there would be no physical human actions. There would be plenty of
human outward behaviour, of course, but no physical human actions. No part of
the physical history of the world would be made by us; the parts of that history
in which we are involved would be made merely through us, with our assent or
without, and very likely we would not even have a choice regarding assenting or
not assenting to what is going on physically. You assert it as a certainty that there
are no situations of physical indetermination in the human sphere. I do not be-
lieve that this is a certainty; I believe it is far from a certainty. But I am ready to
admit: perhaps there are indeed no situations of physical indetermination in the
human sphere. If this turns out to be true, then, I submit, philosophers should
quit playing around with words; then they should have the intellectual honesty
to admit that there are no human physical actions and that therefore nobody is
truly responsible for anything in the physical world.
Objection 7: Well, that seems a bit panicky. Let’s not panic here. I, in any case,
won’t panic. Though my entire physical behaviour is executed by a determinis-
tic automaton, as I rmly believe, parts of that behaviour are actions of mine, for
which I am indeed truly, truly responsible. I could not be more truly responsible
for them: because they agree with what I consider, after careful deliberation, to
be my most important goals and needs; because they agree with my essence, so
to speak. I am free, see. I could not be any freer. – But be that as it may, returning
to agent-causation, I would nally like to point out that agent-causation is a com-
pletely obscure idea. I have no idea what you mean when you say that an agent
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causes a physical event without an event causing it, in other words, when you al-
legedly refer to an instance of narrow agent-causation, as you call it.
Response to Objection 7: The heart of causation is that the cause makes a possi-
ble event actual. Concepts of causation must at least come near to this idea. If a
concept called “causation of this or that type” does not come near to that idea,
then that concept has nothing to do with causation conceptually, but pays mere
lip service to it. Having considered the various concepts of event-causation, I do
not believe that any extant concept of event-causation comes nearer to themaking
actual of possible events than narrow agent-causation does. If you are telling me
that you do not understand narrow agent-causation, you are in eect telling me
that you do not understand the making actual of possible events. But then, how
can you understand any proper concept of causation, any concept of causation
that does not pay mere lip service to causation? I concede that in narrow agent-
causation we are confronted with just the agent-causal relation, and that there
is nothing that ts between the agent-cause and its eect. Event-causation does
not have this kind of immediacy: it is founded on laws andmechanisms, and usu-
ally in event-causation, an event-causal chain ts in between cause and eect. All
of this creates the illusion that event-causation is better understood than narrow
agent-causation. But in fact, to the extent that event-causation really deserves the
name “causation”, it is no better understood than narrow agent-causation.
12 Agent-causation and freedom of the will
In his inuential book Das Handwerk der Freiheit, the Swiss philosopher Peter
Bieri writes that the freedom of the will consists in the will being determined in
a rather specic way: by our thinking and judging.⁶ Many philosophers nd this
denition of the freedom of the will entirely satisfactory, and all the more so be-
cause it is compatible with determinism. I do not believe that Bieri’s idea of the
freedom of the will is correct. Would my will be still free if, indeed, it were some-
times determined by my thinking and judging, but my thinking and judging, in
turn, were always determined by causes that have nothing to do with my think-
ing and judging? Contrary to what Bieri and other compatibilist philosophers are
satised to believe, I do not think that my will would be free under the condition
just envisaged. But I concede that that condition comprises all thatmy rationality
6 Bieri (2001), 80: “Die Freiheit desWillens liegt darin, dass er auf ganz bestimmteWeise bedingt
ist: durch unser Denken und Urteilen”.
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could at most amount to if human beings were in fact deterministic automata, as
many brain-scientists believe and do not hesitate to proclaim with the full weight
of their presumed scientic authority. A fortiori, that condition comprises all that
my rationality could at most amount to if determinism ruled the world. If I am a de-
terministic automaton, which under determinism I must be, then my rationality
could at most amount to this: though my thinking and judging are always deter-
mined by causes that have nothing to do with my thinking and judging, my will is
sometimes determined by my thinking and judging. – Well, great. Am I then truly
rational, even free? I do not think so. How, in the world, could my will, if it is ul-
timately determined by external factors that have nothing to do with my thinking
or judging, be truly rational or free?
But perhaps human beings are not deterministic automata. There is room for rea-
sonable doubt. And if human beings are not deterministic automata, then there is
room for agent-causation, and room for free will, properly speaking. Specically,
an indirect explicit physical action Y of mine, event-causally traceable to a direct
implicit physical action Z of mine, is certain to be an act of my freewill if all of the
following conditions are fullled:
(i) no agent other than me causes Z;
(ii)my causing of Z is not somehowdetermined, and it resolves a situation of phys-
ical indetermination;
(iii) Y is rationally intended by me at least from the time shortly before my agent-
causing Y (= the time of my agent-causing Z) to the time shortly after my coming
to experience that Y is willed by me, and
(iv) Y would not have happened without Z having happened.
13 The way from freely willed behaviour to
agent-causation
1. An arm rises: the event Y takes place, and the subject of the human being
whose (right) arm rose, P, declares that she freely raised her arm.
2. Suppose she is right. Then, either Yhas an event-cause (2.1), or Yhas no event-
cause (2.2).
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3. I opt for 2.1. Then, either there is a complete and stopping chain of event-
causes⁷ for Y (3.1), or there is none (3.2).
4. I opt for 3.1. Then, either there is a complete and stopping chain of event-
causes for Y which is such that the rst event of it is temporally close to Y
and located in the brain of P (4.1), or there is no such chain (4.2).
5. I opt for 4.1. Then, either there is exactly one complete and stopping chain of
event-causes for Y which is such as described in 4. (5.1), or there is not exactly
one such chain (5.2).
6. I opt for 5.1. Then, let Φ be the complete and stopping chain of event-causes
for Y which is such that the rst element of it, 1(Φ), is temporally close to Y
and located in the brain of P; either there is a sucient cause of 1(Φ) (6.1), or
there is none (6.2).
7. I opt for 6.1. Then, either there is exactly one sucient cause of 1(Φ) (7.1), or
there is not exactly one such cause of 1(Φ) (7.2).
8. I opt for 7.1. Then, either the sucient cause of 1(Φ) is P (8.1), or not (8.2).
9. I opt for 8.1.
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